Are smarter people more procedure invariant? An online experiment investigating the eff ects of cognitive ability on preference reversal
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June 2011 University of Nottingham |
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| Abstract | In the preference reversal literature, models of stochastic choice and error are increasingly endorsed as explanations of the phenomenon. In this paper, I document an online experiment examining whether there exists the negative link between cognitive ability and observation of preference reversal that an error-led approach may imply. I find that cognitive ability has no effect on whether subjects exhibit PR or not, but that when subjects do so, the extent of reversal is strongly and negatively linked to cognitive ability. I find that part of this effect is caused by increased simple error making amongst lower cognitive ability subjects, but argue that further research is needed to establish the full nature of the association, incorporating more detailed notions of error and cognitive ability.
Keywords: preference reversal, cognitive ability, errors, decision making, risky choice |
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| Appendices |
Core dataset: Excel  CSV 
Full dataset: Instructions/screenshots/parameters: Beginners’ guide and explanation |
| License | Licensed under Creative Commons Attibution-NonCommercial 3.0. |